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The beginning of the new millennium brings with it a variety of
technological advances and, as a result, more than a handful of le-
gal issues. One of the most prominent technological break-
throughs is the Internet. In the last few years, courts have been
faced with a barrage of Internet related legal dilemmas.' The focus
of this Comment is whether the legal doctrine of "initial interest
confusion"' should be applied in metatag3 related trademark in-
fringement cases.4 Likelihood of confusion is required to prove
trademark infringement. Such likelihood, however, is not easily
apparent in cases involving trademark infringement through the
use of metatags6 (parts of programming language embedded in a
* Yelena Dunaevsky is a Juris Doctor candidate and will graduate from Ford-
ham University School of Law in 2002. This Comment is dedicated to my parents and
grandparents, without whom its creation would not have been possible.
1. See Stanley U. Paylago, Trademark Infringement, Metatags, and the Initial In-
terest Confusion Remedy, 9 MEDIA L. & POL'Y 49 (2000) (listing hyperlinking, cyber-
squatting, and metatagging as novel problems among the intellectual property issues
raised by the Internet); see also Jeffrey J. Look, The Virtual Wild Wild West (WWW):
Intellectual Property Issues in Cyberspace-Trademarks, Service Marks, Copyrights,
and Domain Names, 22 U. ARx. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 49 (1999) (discussing conflict-
ing legal ideologies about the Internet).
2. Initial interest confusion is a doctrine coined by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Brookfield Communications v. W. Coast Entm't, 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th
Cir. 1999). For a more detailed discussion of initial interest confusion see discussion
infra Part II.D.
3. A metatag is a special encoded term that is hidden in the code of a webpage
(an electronic page on the Internet which contains various information) to provide
information about the webpage. Unlike normal tags, metatags do not affect how the
page is displayed. Instead, they provide information such as who created the page,
how often it is updated, what the page is about, and which keywords represent the
page's content. Many search engines use this information when building their indices.
Webopedia definition of a metatag, at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/m/
meta tag.htmlhttp://www.webopedia.com/TERM/M/meta-tag.html (last visited Jan.
15, 2002). For a detailed discussion of metatags, see discussion infra Part I.D.
4. The cases discussed in Part III of this Comment all focus on the issue of trade-
mark infringement through the unauthorized use of trademarks in the metatags of
websites. The cases also focus on the question of whether the doctrine of initial inter-
est confusion can be used to determine whether infringement occurred.
5. See discussion infra Part II.C.
6. See discussion infra Part I.D.
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webpage that Web designers use to describe their webpages).7
Therefore, some courts have used initial interest confusion" (the
transient confusion that Internet users may experience while
searching for a particular product or service on the Internet) to
lower the legal threshold for the required proof of confusion.9 This
Comment argues that because it does not improve or clarify the
existing process of legal inquiry in a trademark infringement litiga-
tion, the doctrine of initial interest confusion is a superfluous legal
tool and may even be harmful from a public policy perspective.
Specifically, this Comment explores whether the doctrine of ini-
tial interest confusion, as used in metatag related cases, serves any
useful purpose not already served by the expanded definition of
actual confusion,"° which is required to prove the likelihood of con-
fusion element1' in a trademark infringement suit. This Comment
concludes that the usefulness of the doctrine is greatly compro-
mised not only by the broad definition of actual confusion,12 but
also by the limitations imposed on consumers by a strict implemen-
tation of the doctrine.13 Part I of this Comment provides back-
ground information on the Internet, search engines 14 and metatags.
7. See infra note 18.
8. See discussion infra Part II.D.
9. See discussion infra Part III.A.
10. The existence of actual confusion is one of the factors courts use to determine
the existence of trademark infringement. Powder River Oil v. Powder River Petro-
leum, 830 P.2d 403, 416-17 (Wyo. 1992) (holding that likelihood of confusion among
suppliers as well as consumers deserves the same consideration as a relevant factor in
determining infringement); see also discussion of the "Polaroid factors" infra Part
II.C. Actual confusion is the confusion usually experienced by consumers as to the
origin of a trademarked item. Actual confusion may be proven by direct testimony or
established by consumer surveys, misdirected mail or misdirected telephone calls.
Powder River, 830 P.2d at 416. See also Paylago, supra note 1, at 56 (stating that some
courts have expanded the definition of actual confusion to include pre-sale, sale, post-
sale and even no-sale confusion).
11. Likelihood of confusion is the core element of trademark infringement.
Brookfield Communications v. W. Coast Entm't, 174 F.3d 1036, 1053 (9th Cir. 1999).
The standard used to prove likelihood of confusion is whether the similarity of the
trademarks is likely to confuse consumers about the source of the products. Id.
12. Actual confusion may be defined as the confusion as to the source of the prod-
uct or service that consumers experience in connection with their purchase of such
product or service and may be proven by anecdotal or survey evidence. The evidence
must provide a "substantial likelihood that the public will be confused." Playboy En-
ters. v. Terri Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1083 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
13. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
14. Search engines are programs that search "documents for specified keywords
and return a list of the documents where the keywords were found. Although the
term "search engine" really refers to a general class of programs, the term is often
used to specifically describe systems like Alta Vista and Excite that enable users to
search for documents on the World Wide Web." Webopedia definition of a search
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Part II offers an update on the relevant trademark law. Part III
presents a brief overview of the recent court cases involving
metatags and initial interest confusion. Finally, Part IV argues that
a hasty expansion of the trademark law in applying the doctrine of
initial interest confusion to metatag related cases may prove detri-
mental to both trademark law and the economy. Such expansion
will likely not only promote superfluity, but would also favor the
protection of trademark owners without considering the interests
of consumers. This would, in turn, undermine consumers' free ac-
cess to information and stifle healthy economic competition.
I. THE WORLD WIDE WEB
5
A. The Internet
The Internet, or the "World Wide Web," is a worldwide network
providing connections between millions of computers, thereby fa-
cilitating the communication and exchange of information.16 The
Internet offers an effective medium for businesses to advertise, sell
their products or supply consumers with a variety of other informa-
tion made available on the World Wide Web. 17 This information is
located on electronic webpages 18 and is becoming available to an
increasing number of consumers. 19 For example, over 2.8 million
engine, at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/s/search-engine.htmlhttp://www.webo
pedia.com/TERM/d/domainname.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2002). Alta Vista is lo-
cated at http://www.altavista.comhttp://www.altavista.com; Excite is located at http://
www.excite.com.
15. The World Wide Web is a "system of Internet servers that support specially
formatted documents." Webopedia definition of the World Wide Web, at http://
www.webopedia.com/TERM/W/WorldWideWeb.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2002).
The documents are formatted in a language called HTML (Hyper Text Markup
Language) that supports links to other documents, as well as graphics, audio and
video files. Id. This means a user can jump from one document to another simply by
clicking on the links. Id.
16. Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 311-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (providing a brief
review of the fundamentals of the Internet).
17. See Playboy Enters. v. Terri Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1091 (S.D. Cal. 1999)
(supporting the view that the Internet has become a popular medium for advertising
and direct consumer access to goods and services).
18. Electronic webpages are pages on the World Wide Web, that vary in content,
are usually combined into websites and are accessible through almost any computer.
Paylago, supra note 1, at 52 (discussing judicial application of trademark law to
metatag infringers and advocating the use of pre-sale confusion doctrine in the
metatag context).
19. Id. at 51-2.
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websites 2° existed in 1999, while the current number of webpages is
estimated at over one billion.21
B. Domain Names22
Internet users have two basic options to locate needed informa-
tion. The first option allows a web surfer2 3 to access a specific site
by entering the site's domain name into his web browser 'S24 ad-
dress window. Domain names are used to identify webpages on
the Internet.25 Every webpage has an assigned domain name that
serves to distinguish it from millions of other webpages. 26 Essen-
tially, a domain name serves as a street address by which different
pages on the Internet can be located. A user can either type the
domain name directly into the address bar on his browser immedi-
ately and bring up the desired webpage, or, if he does not remem-
ber the specific domain name, he can use a search engine.27
20. Terrell W. Mills, Metatags: Seeking to Evade User Detection and the Lanham
Act, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 22, *7 (2000) (evaluating the validity of trademark infringe-
ment, false advertising and dilution claims arising from the use of trademarks in
webpage metatags and concluding that trademark law is ill-equipped to address
metatag misuse). A website is a location on the World Wide Web that contains a
home page-the first document users see when they enter the site-and additional doc-
uments or files, which are normally stored on other webpages that link to the home
page. Each site is owned and managed by an individual, company or organization.
Webopedia definition of a website, at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/W/web
site.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2002).
21. Veronica Tucci, The Case of the Invisible Infringer: Trademarks, Metatags and
Initial Interest Confusion, 5 J. TECH L. & POL'Y 2, *8 (2000) (evaluating recent case
law on trademark infringement through the use of metatags and concluding that
courts readily enjoin and sometimes fine companies for using their competitor's
marks in metatags).
22. Domain names are used to identify particular Webpages. Webopedia
definition of a domain name, at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/d/domainname.
html (last visited Jan. 10, 2002).
23. The term "surfing" is generally used to describe an undirected type of web
browsing in which the user jumps from page to page as opposed to searching for
specific information. Webopedia definition of surfing, at http://www.webopedia.com/
TERM/s/surf.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2002).
24. A "Web browser," or simply "browser," is a software application used to lo-
cate and display webpages. The two most popular browsers are Netscape Navigator
and Microsoft Internet Explorer. Webopedia definition of a web browser, at http://
www.webopedia.com/TERM/b/browser.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2002).
25. Webopedia definition of a domain name, at http://www.webopedia.com/
TERM/d/domain-name.htmlhttp://www.webopedia.com/TERM/d/domainname.html
(last visited Jan. 10, 2002).
26. Tucci, supra note 21, at *9.
27. For a more detailed discussion of search engines, see discussion infra Part I.C.
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Domain names contain two main parts: a top level domain and a
second level domain.28 The top level domain indicates the type of
organization that operates the webpage. 29 For example, businesses
usually use ".com" as their top level domain; organizations use
".org"; educational institutions are designated by ".edu"; and gov-
ernment agencies by ".gov. '"30 The second level domain consists of
the company's name, its product or a term descriptive of the com-
pany's name, product or business.31 "Yahoo" and "nytimes" are
examples of second level domains; thus, familiar domain names in-
clude "yahoo.com" and "nytimes.com".32
C. Search Engines
The second strategy websurfers use to locate information in-
volves search engines.33 If a user does not know the exact domain
name of the website he needs to access, he can enter keywords into
a search engine. 34 The search engine will then scan millions of
webpages35 to retrieve the information that matches the searched
keywords. 36 Based on the keywords provided by the consumer, the
28. Tucci, supra note 21, at *9.
29. Id.
30. Webopedia definition of a domain name, at http://www.webopedia.com/
TERM/d/domain-name.htmlhttp://www.webopedia.com/TERM/d/domain-name.html
(last visited Jan. 10, 2002).
31. See Tucci, supra note 21, at *9.
32. Yahoo is located at http://www.yahoo.com; New York Times is located at http:/
/www.nytimes.com. The majority of Internet related trademark infringement litiga-
tion occurs in the area of domain names, but this Comment focuses solely on trade-
mark infringement resulting from the incorrect use of metatags. See, e.g., Rachel Jane
Posner, Manipulative Metatagging, Search Engine Baiting, and Initial Interest Confu-
sion, 33 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 439, 457-62 (2000) (describing several cases in
which the doctrine of initial interest confusion is applied to domain name trademark
infringement situations). See generally Adam Silberlight, WWW. How to Be a Master
of Your Domain. Corn: A Look at the Assignment of Internet Domain Names Under
Federal Trademark Laws, Federal Case Law and Beyond, 10 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH.
229 (2000) (providing an overview of the Internet domain name scheme and analyzing
contemporary trademark law).
33. Paylago, supra note 1, at 52-3.
34. Id.
35. "Typically, a search engine works by sending out a "spider" to fetch as many
documents as possible. Another program, called an "indexer," then reads these docu-
ments and creates an index based on the words contained in each document."
Webopedia definition of a search engine, at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/s/
search-engine.htmlhttp://www.webopedia.comfERM/d/domainname.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 18, 2002).
36. See Tucci, supra note 21, at *11; Shannon N. King, Brookfield Communica-
tions v. W. Coast Entm't, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 313, 315-16 (2000) (advocating
against judicial application of trademark law to metatag cases and asserting that in-
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search engine retrieves web addresses3 7 that link to the pages con-
taining closely matching information when the user clicks on the
link with a mouse.38
Search engines operate via two general methods: the "human-
centered" method and the "mechanical" method.39 Search engines
like Yahoo are human-centered because their directories are com-
piled by people who individually evaluate every new website.4 °
The mechanical method, used by search engines such as Alta
Vista and Excite, provides "a mechanical index of the Web" by al-
lowing massive databases to continuously search and read through
thousands of new websites and then to index the websites accord-
ing to certain specifications. 41 These specifications are provided by
human beings who write "web crawling" programs,42 but such pro-
grams do not have the flexibility of making intelligent choices.43
Unlike human-centered search engines such as Yahoo, web crawl-
ing programs provide an avalanche of results, which often lack logi-
cal connection to the user's keywords.4 Thus, although the
human-centered method is slower than the mechanical method, its
organization is probably more logical and useful to the Internet
surfer.45 This is where the process of ranking results becomes
important.46
consistent application of trademark doctrine promotes litigation, increases business
costs and taxes judicial resources).
37. See Posner, supra note 32, at 443 (arguing that traditional trademark laws ap-
ply to metatagging and that federal courts should uniformly apply the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning in Brookfield). See infra Part III.A for a discussion of the Brookfield case.
38. A mouse is a device that controls the movement of the cursor or pointer on a
display screen. It was invented by Douglas Engelbart of Stanford Research Center in
1963 and is now used with most computers. Webopedia definition of a mouse, at http:/
/www.webopedia.com/TERM/m/mouse.html (last visited on Jan. 18, 2002).
39. F. Gregory Lastowka, Search Engines, HTML, and Trademarks: What's the
Meta For?, 86 VA. L. REV. 835, 847-48 (2000) (examining the legal and technical is-
sues surrounding metatag use and arguing that law and policy favor the application of
traditional trademark law to deceptive description metatags, but that keyword
metatag problems are better addressed through market-driven technological
innovations).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 848.
42. Web crawling programs gather content information of individual webpages by
reading the code of those webpages and then store the text that they find on each
page in cyberspace memory. Playboy Enters. v. Terri Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1092
(S.D. Cal. 1999).
43. See Lastowka, supra note 39, at 848-49.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 849.
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Search engines use ranking systems to determine the order in
which they present their results to Internet users. 47 Different en-
gines use different factors when devising their ranking systems.48
A common factor is the number of "times a given search term ap-
pears on a [w]eb page. ' 49 The likelihood of a search engine picking
out a specific webpage increases with the number of times a given
search term is used in that page.5 ° Search engines also differ in the
"relevance factor 51 they assign to metatags.52 Some award great
weight to "keyword metatags"; 53 others, like Excite, ignore them
altogether. 4 In other words, search engines focus on different
properties or attributes of webpages to procure the list of websites'
they produce for the Internet users.
If a web surfer is using a search engine which does not rely heav-
ily on metatags, 55 he is less likely to be confused by an improper
use of a metatag and thus less likely to suffer initial interest confu-
sion.56 Even if a search engine relies heavily on metatags, 57 the
chance of encountering initial interest confusion is small because
the search engine only generates a list of available websites 8
Thus, the search engine does not force the user onto any specific
site, but simply lets him choose from the list of websites that it
generates. 9
Normally, a user can distinguish the source of the website based
on either the short description of the website or its domain name.6 °
47. Id.
48. Id. at 849-50.
49. Lastowka, supra note 39, at 849.
50. Id.
51. Search engines assign relevance factors to different aspects of websites to pro-
vide users with a list of results that are most relevant to the user's search term(s). Id.
at 849. However, the formula for determining relevance is not uniform among differ-
ent search engines. Id. at 849-50.
52. See discussion infra Part I.D.
53. Keyword metatags are used to specify the terms that are contained in the web-
site and that are picked up by search engines during a search. See Mills, supra note 20,
at *6; see also King, supra note 36, at 314-15. For a more detailed discussion of
keyword metatags, see discussion infra Part I.D.
54. Lastowka, supra note 39, at 849-50.
55. See discussion infra Part I.D.
56. For a detailed discussion of initial interest confusion, see discussion infra Part
II.D.
57. See discussion infra Part I.D.
58. Dan McCuaig, Halve the Baby: An Obvious Solution to the Troubling Use of
Trademarks as Metatags, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 643, 647 (2000)
(suggesting a solution to the use of trademarks as metatags).
59. Id.
60. Posner, supra note 32, at 446.
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Both of these distinguishing features are displayed underneath the
website's link in the list produced by the search engine.61 If the
user makes a mistake by clicking on an incorrect page, or is dissat-
isfied with the products offered by the page he first chose, he can
"normally return to the list produced by the search engine by se-
lecting the 'back' key" on his Web browser.62 Thus, search engines
do not trap users into particular websites, but simply provide users
with a number of choices. 63
D. Metatags
As discussed in Part I.C, some search engines match users'
keywords to the metatags of Internet websites. 64 "A metatag is
part of the webpage programming language that is embedded on a
webpage, but never seen by the end user. '65 Web designers use
metatags to describe their webpages.66 The two types of metatags
that some search engines use to index and rank websites, and
which are most relevant to trademark infringement litigation be-
cause they have a greater chance of causing initial interest confu-
sion, are the "keyword" and the "description" metatags.67
A "keyword" metatag is used to specify the terms contained in
the website.68 If one or more of these terms is matched with the
user's search request, the website containing the metatag is in-
cluded in the results of the search.69 Search engines also read
"description" metatags, which allow web designers to give "a brief
description of the contents of their pages in plain English. 70
There are reasons why websites strive to attract as many users as
possible and why they use metatags to do so. To make money, a
website must attract users.71 A website can make money in two
72ways. The first way is through selling the products or services
61. Id. at 445-46.
62. Id. at 446.
63. McCuaig, supra note 58, at 662 (mentioning that Internet surfers have freedom
to select the websites they want to visit from the list generated by search engines);
Mills, supra note 20, at *26 (same).
64. See discussion supra Part I.C.
65. Mills, supra note 20, at *6.
66. Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 312 n.3. (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
67. King, supra note 36, at 314-15.
68. Mills, supra note 20, at *6; King, supra note 36, at 314-15.
69. Mills, supra note 20, at *6.
70. Lastowka, supra note 39, at 846.




offered on the site.73 The second is by selling advertising space on
the website to third parties.7 1 The price of the advertisements de-
pends on the volume of users that visit the site; the price goes up
with an increase in the number of visitors.
Webpage developers advocate the use of metatags because
metatags are most effective in attracting more attention to the
site. 76 To further increase exposure, many web developers include
an extensive number of terms and term variations in their
metatags.77 Some even repeat the same term over and over again
hoping that high frequency of the term will attract the search en-
gine's attention.78 Others go so far as to include popular terms that
have nothing to do with the site.79
It is common practice for web designers to include all kinds of
words, names, symbols, or even trademarked terms in their
metatags "to capture the attention of every possible interested
user."80 Problems arise when a business includes trademarks of its
competitors in the metatags of its website.81 Some argue that such
practice constitutes infringement under the trademark laws;82




76. Mills, supra note 20, at *9.
77. Id.
78. See Posner, supra note 32, at 446.
79. Mills, supra note 20, at *9.
80. King, supra note 36, at 315.
81. See, e.g., Brookfield Communications v. W. Coast Entm't, 174 F.3d 1036, 1066
(9th Cir. 1999) (holding defendants liable for trademark infringement for the use of
plaintiff's trademark in metatags of defendants' website); SNA, Inc. v. Array, 51 F.
Supp. 2d 554, 562-63 (E.D. Penn. 1999) (same); see discussion infra Parts III.A and
III.B.
82. See J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks, Cybersquatters and Domain Names, 10
J. ART & ENT. LAW 231, 235-6 (2000) (supporting the Brookfield decision by stating
that initial interest confusion can be used as an element of trademark infringement in
metatag situations). Several courts have already concluded that the use of another's
trademark in the metatags of one's website constitutes trademark infringement. See
supra note 81.
83. See Playboy Enters. v. Terri Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1073 (S.D. Cal. 1999)
(upholding the defense of fair use in a trademark infringement litigation involving
defendant's use of plaintiff's trademarks in her metatags).
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II. TRADEMARK LAW
A. Trademarks
The Trademark Act of 1946, commonly known as the Lanham
Trade-Mark Act 84 (the Act), is the foundation of federal protection
for trademarks.85 "A federally registered trademark is a mark that
provides the registrant with its exclusive use in commerce or in
connection with the goods or services specified in the registra-
tion."'86 The Act defines a trademark to include
any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof-
(1) used by a person, or
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce
and applies to register on the principal register established
by this chapter, to identify and distinguish his or her goods,
including a unique product, from those manufactured or
sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even
if that source is unknown.87
In short, "[a] trademark is a 'limited property' right in a particu-
lar word, phrase, or symbol. ' 8  Examples of commonly known
trademarks include Coca-Cola, Ford and Blockbuster.89
Trademarks are not, however, limited to words.9' Stylized logos,
artistic designs, colors, and even sounds can be registered as trade-
marks.91 Some examples are Nike's "Swoosh" and the three sound
combination known as the "NBC chimes. '92
Trademarks do not even need to be registered to be protected.93
"A person can acquire trademark rights . . . 'simply by using a
mark on or in connection with goods."' 94 For example, if McDon-
ald's had not registered its golden arches, but had widely used
them for some period of time in connection with its business, it
84. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2000).
85. Posner, supra note 32, at 448.
86. Paylago, supra note 1, at 54.
87. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
88. Playboy, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1073 (quoting New Kids on the Block v. News Am.
Publ'g, 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1992)).
89. Tucci, supra note 21, at *21.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 22.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Shade's Landing v. James C. Williams, 76 F. Supp. 2d 983, 987 (D.
Minn. 1999) (finding that even a common law trademark qualifies for protection
under the Lanham Act as long as it satisfies certain parameters).
94. Posner, supra note 32, at 448 (quoting WILLIAM M. BORCHARD, A TRADE-
MARK IS NOT A COPYRIGHT OR A PATENT 4 (1999)).
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could successfully argue that the golden arches were its trademark.
The only two basic requirements for unregistered trademarks are
that their use be "actual" and "commercial. 95
Protection of trademark rights serves two primary purposes.96
First, it reduces the likelihood of consumer confusion by protecting
the public from misleading trademark practices and by providing
economic incentives for businesses to clearly identify and maintain
their trademarks.9 7 Second, by providing a legal barrier to the mis-
appropriation and pirating of trademarks, trademark laws protect
the time, energy and capital that trademark owners invest 98 into
establishing and developing their marks. 99
95. 'Use' of a mark means the bona fide use of such mark made in the ordi-
nary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark [i.e.,
"actual use"].... The term 'use in commerce' means the bona fide use of a
mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right
in a mark. For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be deemed to be in use
in commerce (1) on goods when (A) it is placed in any manner on the goods
or their containers or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or
labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such placement
impracticable, then on documents associated with the goods or their sale,
and (B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and (2) on services
when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the
services are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered in more
than one State or in the United States and a foreign country and the person
rendering the services is engaged in commerce in connection with the
services.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
96. See PACCAR v. Telescan Techs., 115 F. Supp. 2d 772, 780 (E.D. Mich. 2000)
(stating that it is in the "public's interest to protect consumers from confusion and [to]
protect the right of a trademark owner to control its own product's reputation").
97. See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Terri Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1074 (S.D. Cal.
1999).
98. See, e.g., King, supra note 36, at 316; see also McCuaig, supra note 58, at 647
(suggesting a solution to metatag related trademark infringement by creating a new
"Trademark" metatag); Thcci, supra note 21, at *23.
99. While trademark owners can bring claims against an alleged violator for,
among other things, infringement, dilution, and false advertising, this Comment fo-
cuses on federal trademark infringement only. "The term 'dilution' means the lessen-
ing of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services,
regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition between the owner of the
famous mark and other Parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception."
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). The purpose of the 1996 amendment to the Act, which al-
lows one to bring the claim of dilution as a federal cause of action, is to extend the
bounds of trademark infringement "to remedy any reduction in the public perception
of a trademarked term that does not rise to the standards needed for an infringement
cause of action." Silberlight, supra note 32, at 254 (providing an overview of the In-
ternet domain name scheme and analyzing contemporary trademark law). Section
43(a)(1)(B) of the Act protects trademark owners from false advertising. To succeed
on a false advertising claim, a trademark owner does not need to prove likelihood of
confusion, but he must prove (1) that defendants made false or deceptive advertise-
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B. Trademark Infringement
The Act provides a detailed definition of trademark infringe-
ment. It does not permit any person, without the registrant's con-
sent, to
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or col-
orable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the
sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods
or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a regis-
tered mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or
colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers,
receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce
upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribu-
tion, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with
which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake,
or to deceive .... 1oo
Thus, to prove trademark infringement under the Act, a plaintiff
must show that (1) he has a valid mark entitled to protection under
the Act; (2) he owns the mark; (3) a copy of the mark was used by
another; (4) such use was commercial; and (5) the use is likely to
cause confusion as to the origin of the mark. 01
This Comment will assume a plaintiff has satisfied the first, sec-
ond and third requirements and focus only on the fourth and fifth
requirements. The fourth requirement provides that, to sustain a
cause of action for infringement, the use of a trademark must be
commercial.'0 2 Noncommercial use is not actionable under the
Act.10 3 However, the tests for "use in commerce' ' 0 4 and "in con-
nection with goods and services," 0 5 which courts use to determine
whether the use of a trademark is commercial, are exceedingly
ments or representation to customer, (2) that those advertisements deceived a signifi-
cant portion of the consuming public, and (3) that trademark owner was injured by
defendant's conduct. Mills, supra note 20, at *34; Posner, supra note 32, at 449.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2000).
101. See, e.g., Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 316-17 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Eli Lilly
v. Natural Answers, 86 F. Supp. 2d 834, 840 (S.D. Ind.) affd, 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir.
2000); Paylago, supra note 1, at 55 (2000); Mills, supra note 20, at *13 (citing J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS §27.13 (3d ed. 1996)); Tucci,
supra note 21, at *28.
102. See, e.g., Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 318.
103. Id.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
105. Id. § 1125(a)(1).
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broad and are, therefore, easy to satisfy. 10 6 The connection with
goods or services, for example, does not need to be a direct con-
nection;10 7 merely selling advertising space is sufficient to satisfy
the "use in commerce" requirement. 108 Proving the likelihood of
confusion, however, can be difficult.
C. Confusion
The fifth requirement, which involves "likelihood of confusion,"
is considered to be the cornerstone of trademark infringement. 10 9
Although each of the United States circuit courts of appeals has
developed its own test for determining whether likelihood of con-
fusion is present,"10 most of the tests use eight similar factors."'
The Second Circuit, for example, employs an eight-factor test es-
tablished by Judge Friendly in Polaroid v. Polaroid Electronics."2
The eight factors are
1. the strength of the plaintiff's mark;
2. the degree of similarity between the two marks;
3. the competitive proximity of the products or services;
4. the likelihood that the plaintiff will "bridge the gap" be-
tween the two markets;
5. the existence of actual confusion;
6. the defendant's good faith in adopting its mark;
7. the quality of the defendant's product; and
8. the sophistication of the purchasers.
1 3
106. Mills, supra note 20, at *15 (explaining that almost all commercial websites
will meet the requirements of these tests).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Nissan Motor v. Nissan Computer, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1162 (C.D. Cal. 2000);
Brookfield Communications v. W. Coast Entm't, 174 F.3d 1036, 1053 (9th Cir. 1999);
Mills, supra note 20, at *16; Paylago, supra note 1, at *55; Posner, supra note 32, at
452.
110. PACCAR v. Telescan Techs., 115 F. Supp. 2d 772, 776 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (list-
ing the eight factors that the Sixth Circuit uses to determine whether likelihood of
confusion exists); Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1053-54 (listing the Ninth Circuit's eight
factors); Eli Lilly v. Natural Answers, 86 F. Supp. 2d 834, 840-41 (S.D. Ind.) affd, 233
F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000) (listing the Seventh Circuit's seven factors).
111. Compare, for example, the factors the Ninth Circuit used in Brookfield, 14
F.3d at 1053-54 with the factors set forth by the Sixth Circuit in PACCAR, 115 F.
Supp. 2d at 776 and note the similarity among the characteristics used to evaluate the
likelihood of confusion.
112. Polaroid v. Polaroid Elec., 287 F.2d 492, 498 (2d Cir. 1996).
113. N. Y. State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., 79 F.
Supp. 2d 331, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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Although all eight factors pose legal hurdles, the questions
raised in this Comment focus primarily on three factors: the exis-
tence of actual confusion, a defendant's good faith, and consumer
sophistication.
D. Initial Interest Confusion
Several courts have held that a showing of actual confusion is not
required to maintain an action for trademark infringement as long
as "other factors point to a significant likelihood of actual confu-
sion.''n4 Although actual confusion is not required for a showing
of trademark infringement, a mere possibility of actual confusion is
not enough.11 5 "The test for actual confusion is not whether any-
one could possibly be confused, but whether the 'reasonably pru-
dent consumer' is likely to be confused." 116
The broad scope of this test explains why some courts have been
flexible enough to accept the theory of "initial interest confu-
sion."" 7 Initial interest confusion is different from confusion at the
point of sale, which is the most common type of confusion in an
infringement action. 1 8 The point of sale confusion occurs when
the consumer decides to purchase a product, but is somehow mis-
led as to the product's origin at the time of the purchase. 119
To the contrary, initial interest confusion occurs before the sale
is made.2 0 The consumer discovers his initial confusion before the
sale, but instead of correcting his mistake he proceeds to purchase
the product he initially mistook for the original. 2  Courts agree
that when a vendor intentionally diverts consumer attention from
his competitor by using the competitor's trademark, or something
that may be confused for the competitor's trademark, the vendor
benefits unjustly from the competitor's goodwill and can be ac-
cused of trademark infringement under the Act.122
114. Eli Lilly, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 845; see also PACCAR, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 778
(holding that although a showing of actual confusion constitutes strong evidence of
infringement, the absence of such evidence is not dispositive).
115. Playboy Enters. v. Terri Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1083.
116. The Network Network v. CBS, No. CV 98-1349 NM, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4751, at *17 (C.D. Ca. Jan. 16, 2000) (quoting Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1060).
117. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1061; Nissan Motor v. Nissan Computer, 89 F. Supp. 2d
1154, 1162-163 (C.D. Ca. 2000); Bigstar Entm't v. Next Big Star, 105 F. Supp. 2d 185,
207 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
118. Posner, supra note 32, at 453.






In the context of the Internet, "the concern is that potential con-
sumers of one website (website 1) will be diverted and distracted to
a competing website (website 2)."123 The harm comes from the
fact that potential consumers may believe that website 2 is associ-
ated with website 1 and will be too lazy to resume their search for
website 1.124 Alternatively, if they do not believe that there is any
association between websites 1 and 2, they may still choose to re-
main on website 2 because its information may simply be appealing
enough for them to abandon their initial search. 125 In either situa-
tion, the result is the diversion of potential consumers from their
original search.' 2 6
The doctrine of initial interest confusion has been widely used in
the non-Internet context.127 A majority of federal courts have
found a showing of initial interest confusion sufficient to satisfy the
confusion element of an infringement claim under the Act. 28 For
example, in an oil industry case, Mobil Oil v. Pegasus Petroleum,29
the Second Circuit found that the defendant's trademark name
"Pegasus" caused a likelihood of confusion with the plaintiff's
trademark, a flying horse symbol representing Pegasus, the winged
horse in Greek mythology. Similarly, in a publishing industry case,
Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books USA, 3° the Ninth Circuit
enjoined the defendants, who published a book on the O.J. Simp-
son trial entitled The Cat NOT in the Hat! A Parody by Dr. Juice,
from distributing the book, holding that the title created a strong
likelihood of confusion with the plaintiff's trademarks from the
book The Cat in the Hat.' Although some courts have recently
extended the initial interest confusion doctrine to the Internet, 32
others have refused to make the same leap,133 partially because of
123. Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
124. Id.
125. McCuaig, supra note 58, at 680 (discussing possible consumer responses to
encountering an alternate website).
126. Id.
127. Posner, supra note 32, at 462-63.
128. Id.
129. Mobil Oil v. Pegasus Petroleum, 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987).
130. Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
131. Id. at 1396.
132. E.g., Brookfield Communications v. W. Coast Entm't, 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir.
1999); discussion infra Part III.A; see also SNA, Inc. v. Array, 51 F. Supp. 2d 542
(E.D. Penn. 1999); discussion infra Part III.B.
133. Bigstar Entm't. v. Next Big Star, 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2000);
Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 319 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also Posner, supra
note 32, at 453-54.
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the existence of the "fair use defense," i.e, a defendant's good faith
in adopting the mark.13 4
E. The Good Faith Factor
The Act 135 allows a defendant to defeat a claim of trademark
infringement if he proves that his use of another's mark was fair.136
The Act provides an exception from liability for trademark in-
fringement when 137
the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringe-
ment is a use, otherwise than as a mark, of the party's individual
name in his own business, or of the individual name of anyone in
privity with such party, or of a term or device which is descrip-
tive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the
goods or services of such party, or their geographic origin.' 38
The fair use defense has been applied to the Internet 39 as well as
to non-Internet related cases. 4 ° In the context of metatags, the
fair use defense can be applied when another's trademark is used
in metatags solely to describe the defendant or the defendant's
goods or services. 14
There are two types of fair use defenses: (1) descriptive or classic
fair use and (2) nominative fair use. 42 The descriptive or classic
fair use defense "enables a defendant to use the plaintiff's mark to
describe attributes of the defendant's [own] product.' 1 43 For exam-
ple, in Sunmark v. Ocean Spray Cranberries,44 the Seventh Circuit
allowed the defendant to use the term "sweet-tart," which was a
known trademarked term, to describe its cranberry juice.
134. E.g., Playboy Enters. v. Terri Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (S.D. Cal. 1999)
(holding that defendant's use of plaintiff's trademarks in metatags of defendant's
website was fair because plaintiff's marks legitimately described the defendant and
defendant's business); see also Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 321-24; discussion infra Part
III.E.
135. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
136. Tucci, supra note 21, at *45.
137. Posner, supra note 32, at 467.
138. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
139. See, e.g., Playboy, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1100 (upholding the defense of fair use in a
trademark infringement litigation involving defendant's use of plaintiff's trademarks
in her metatags). For a detailed discussion of this case, see infra Part III.C.
140. Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 321; Paylago, supra note 1, at 58-9.
141. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COM-
PETITION, § 25:69, at 25-150 (4th ed. 1999).
142. Posner, supra note 32, at 468; Tucci, supra note 21, at *46.
143. Tucci, supra note 21, at *47; see also Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 322.




Nominative fair use enables a defendant to use the plaintiff's
mark to show the relationship between the defendant's and the
plaintiff's products. 46 However, the nominative fair use defense
can succeed only if the commercial user (the defendant) satisfies
the following three requirements. 147 First, the product in question
must not be readily identifiable without the use of the trade-
mark.148 Second, the defendant must use only as much of the
plaintiff's mark as is reasonably necessary to identify the defen-
dant's product.1 49 Finally, the user cannot engage in any conduct
that would suggest affiliation with, or endorsement or sponsorship,
by the trademark holder. 50
To benefit from the defense of fair use, a defendant must also act
in good faith.' 5' "The inquiry into a defendant's good faith focuses
on whether 'the defendant adopted its mark with the intention of
capitalizing on plaintiff's reputation and goodwill.... ,152 If the
defendant can show that it used the plaintiff's mark in good faith to
either describe its own product or to compare its product to the
plaintiff's product in an attempt at fair competition, it has a good
chance of defeating the infringement claim.' 53 Because it concerns
a defendant's intent, the fair use defense will undoubtedly play an
increasingly vital role in Internet related trademark infringement
litigation, especially in the area dealing with metatags.
F. Consumer Sophistication
Courts often inquire into the level of sophistication the typical
consumers of a particular product or service possess to determine
whether trademark infringement has occurred.1 54 Internet con-
sumers usually demonstrate adequate sophistication to comforta-
bly navigate the Internet through search engines and to determine
146. Tucci, supra note 21, at *48.
147. See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Pubi'g, 971 F.2d 302, 302-310 (9th
Cir. 1992); Posner, supra note 32, at 468; Tucci, supra note 21, at *48.
148. Posner, supra note 32, at 468; Tucci, supra note 21, at *48.
149. Posner, supra note 32, at 468; Thcci, supra note 21, at *48.
150. Posner, supra note 32, at 468; Tucci, supra note 21, at *48.
151. Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 323.
152. Id. (quoting Lang v. Ret. Living Pub., 949 F.2d 576, 583 (2d Cir. 1991)).
153. See, e.g., Trans Union v. Credit Research, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (N.D. I11. 2001)
(holding that defendants' use of plaintiffs' trademark in defendants' metatags was fair
because it legitimately described defendants' business and the content of their web-
sites). For a detailed discussion of the case, see discussion infra Part III.F.
154. See discussion of Polaroid factors supra Part II.C.
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the origins of particular websites.155 Even unsophisticated users
are not likely to be confused by search engine generated lists of
websites. 156 Thus, the question of adequate consumer sophistica-
tion is unlikely to cause major problems in trademark infringement
cases dealing with metatags.
Il[. CASE LAW DEALING WITH METATAGS AND INITIAL
INTEREST CONFUSION
Because the Internet is a relatively new phenomenon, few cases
have dealt with the doctrine of initial interest confusion in the con-
text of the Internet. 157 Furthermore, because most trademark in-
fringement litigation occurs in the area of domain names,1  the
number of cases focusing specifically on trademark infringement
resulting from unauthorized use of others' metatags is even
smaller. The following six cases, however, cast some light on the
most recent developments in trademark law in the area of
metatags.
From the minute number of existing decisions it is difficult to
predict the development of this legal field. The six decisions ex-
amined in this Comment, however, seem to put greater emphasis
on the defendant's underlying intent than on the determination of
whether the use of the plaintiff's trademark in the defendant's
metatags is likely to cause confusion. The courts also appear to
easily distinguish good faith from bad faith in metatag related situ-
ations, despite neglecting to define the differences between them,
and to draw boundaries around legitimate use of trademarks in
metatags. These trends raise the central question of this Comment:
is the doctrine of initial interest confusion, ushered into this field of
155. King, supra note 36, at 325 (discussing unique expectations of Internet con-
sumers); Posner, supra note 32, at 493 (noting that Internet users are aware of and
have adapted to manipulative metatagging). For a more detailed discussion of con-
sumer sophistication, see discussion supra Part IV.B.5.
156. Mills, supra note 20, at *18 (providing an example of the unlikelihood of such
confusion).
157. The six cases presented in this Comment represent the current extent of judi-
cial authority in this area.
158. Jason R. Berne, Court Intervention But Not in a Classic Form: A Survey of
Remedies in Internet Trademark Cases, 43 ST. Louis L.J. 1157, 1170 (1999) (analyzing
the remedies that courts have applied in cases of trademark infringement on the In-
ternet and stating that most of the Internet trademark infringement claims have fo-




litigation by the notorious Brookfield159 decision, a useful legal tool
or a useless distraction?
A. Brookfield Communications v. West Coast Entertainment160
In Brookfield, the Ninth Circuit was the first court to specifically
address the issue of metatags in a trademark infringement suit.161
In this case, the plaintiff was in the business of gathering and sell-
ing information about the entertainment industry. 162 The plaintiff's
business later expanded onto the Internet in the form of a searcha-
ble database 163 which was marketed under the "MovieBuff"
mark.164 However, when the plaintiff attempted to register the
World Wide Web domain name "moviebuff.com," it was informed
that the same domain name had already been registered by the
defendant. 165 The plaintiff then registered different domain names
to sell its "MovieBuff" computer software and to "offer [its] In-
ternet-based searchable software database [also] marketed under
the 'MovieBuff' mark.' 1 66 The plaintiff then successfully sought to
register the "MovieBuff" mark with the Patent and Trademark
Office. 167
The following year, the plaintiff learned that the defendant, "one
of the nation's largest video rental store chains with over 500
stores," intended to launch its own website at "moviebuff.com,"
which would contain a searchable database similar to Brook-
field's. 168 The plaintiff subsequently filed a lawsuit charging the de-
fendant with trademark infringement in violation of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(1).169
After discussing all the usual elements of a trademark infringe-
ment claim, the court focused on the issue of metatags.170 To ex-
plain an Internet user's confusion resulting from search engine
159. Brookfield Communications v. W. Coast Entm't, 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999);
See also infra notes 159-177.
160. Brookfield Communications v. W. Coast Entm't, 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
161. Paylago, supra note 1, at 62.
162. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1041.
163. A searchable database consists of a collection of information organized in such
a way that a computer program is able to search for the desired data. Webopedia
definition of a database, at http://webopedia.com/TERM/d/database.html (last visited
Jan. 9, 2002).
164. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1041.




169. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1043.
170. Id. at 1064.
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results, the court used its famous, but extensively criticized, 7' anal-
ogy'72 of a highway billboard sign.'7 3 Because the court concluded
that likelihood of confusion was imminent in its billboard scenario,
the court held that likelihood of confusion would occur in a similar
situation involving metatags. 174
West Coast, the defendant, had used the trademark "MovieBuff"
in the metatags of its website to attract consumers to its website.175
The court found that "West Coast [could] legitimately use an ap-
propriate descriptive term in its metatags," but concluded that
"MovieBuff" was not such a term.176 The court determined that
West Coast's use of the term "MovieBuff" in the metatags of its
website was designed solely for the purpose of attracting consum-
ers and was, therefore, "not fair use." '177 The court enjoined the
defendant from using the term as long as the term was used to refer
to the plaintiff's products. 178
B. SNA, Inc. v. Array179
This case was decided by the Federal District Court of the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania approximately one month after the
Ninth Circuit decided the Brookfield case. 180 The plaintiffs were
manufacturers of do-it-yourself kits for an amphibious aircraft
171. This analogy has been extensively criticized as a distortion of "how Internet
search engines function." See King, supra note 36, at 325-26; McCuaig, supra note 58,
at 654.
172. The court's famous analogy is as follows:
Suppose West Coast's competitor (let's call it 'Blockbuster') puts up a bill-
board on a highway reading - 'West Coast Video: 2 miles ahead at Exit 7' -
when West Coast is really located at Exit 8 but Blockbuster is located at Exit
7. Customers looking for West Coast's store will pull off at Exit 7 and drive
around looking for it. Unable to locate West Coast, but seeing the Blockbus-
ter store right by the highway entrance, they may simply rent there. Even
consumers who prefer West Coast may find it not worth the trouble to con-
tinue searching for West Coast since there is a Blockbuster right there. Cus-
tomers are not confused in the narrow sense: they are fully aware that they
are purchasing from Blockbuster and they have no reason to believe that
Blockbuster is related to, or in any way sponsored by, West Coast.
Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1064. E.g., Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 319-20
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (mentioning the billboard analogy); McCuaig, supra note 58, at 661
(same); Paylago, supra note 1, at 64 (same).
173. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1064.




178. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1066.
179. SNA, Inc. v. Array, 51 F. Supp. 2d 554 (E.D. Penn. 1999).
180. Brookfield Communications v. W. Coast Entm't, 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
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called the Seawind.181 The defendants sold and installed turbine
engines for the Seawinds and assembled the do-it-yourself kits for
purchasers. 8 2 The defendants operated two websites, both of
which had previously made references to the plaintiffs.183 The
plaintiffs sued defendants, alleging, inter alia, that the defendants
used the word "Seawind" in the metatags of their websites in viola-
tion of the Act.184
Based on the lower court's finding that the plaintiffs had a com-
mon law trademark in the word "Seawind," the district court con-
cluded that the defendants intentionally used this mark in the
metatags of their websites to "lure [I]nternet users to their site.' '1 85
The court based its decision on "repetitious usage [of the term in
defendants' metatags] and the evidence of defendants' general in-
tent to harm plaintiffs.' 86 The court found that such actions were
made in "bad faith to confuse internet users" and enjoined the de-
fendants' metatagging. 187
C. Playboy Enterprises v. Terri Welles 188
In this California case, the plaintiff, an international publishing
and entertainment company, published the widely popular Playboy
magazine along with numerous specialty magazines, such as Play-
boy's Playmate Review, Playboy's Playmates of the Year and Play-
boy's Calendar Playmates.89 The plaintiff had two websites,
"playboy.com," on which it promoted its magazine, goods and ser-
vices, and "cyber.playboy.com," which was devoted to promoting
the plaintiff's models. 90 The plaintiff also owned registered trade-
marks for the terms "Playboy," "Playmate," "Playmate of the
Month" and "Playmate of the Year."' 91
The defendant was a self-employed model who had modeled for
Playboy magazine in 1980 and was featured as "Playmate of the
Month" and then "Playmate of the Year. 1 92 She had subsequently
181. SNA, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d at 558.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. SNA, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d at 561-62.
185. Id. at 562.
186. Id. at 563.
187. Id.
188. Playboy Enters. v. Terri Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (S.D. Ca. 1999).
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appeared in thirteen issues of Playboy magazine and eighteen of its
newsstand specials. 193
In June of 1997, the defendant opened a website, terriwel-
les.com, which included, among other things, photographs of her-
self and others, and the heading, "Terri Welles-Playmate of the
Year 1981."' 19 Eleven of the fifteen free webpages of the website
included a disclaimer stating that it was not affiliated with the
plaintiff and that the plaintiff held registered trademarks to the
terms "Playboy," "Playmate of the Month" and "Playmate of the
Year."'195 However, the defendant used the terms "Playboy" and
"Playmate" in the metatags of her website.' 96 The defendant
sought permission from the plaintiff for the use of the registered
marks before she launched her website. 97 Plaintiff at first granted
the permission, but later asked the defendant to remove the "Play-
mate of the Year" title from her home page. 98 The defendant's
refusal to do so was followed by a lawsuit alleging, among other
things, trademark infringement pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1). 199
The district court first emphasized the limits of trademark pro-
tection.2 °° It declared specifically that "the 'policies of free compe-
tition and free use of language dictate that trademark law cannot
forbid the commercial use of terms in their descriptive sense."' 20 1
The court then pointed out that the Act contains a fair use defense,
and laid out three elements needed to establish the defense: (1) the
use of the term not in its trademark capacity, (2) the requirement
that the use be in good faith and (3) the requirement that the
description of a defendant's goods or services be the only purpose
of such use.20 2
The court found that the plaintiff's reliance on the Brookfield
decision was "misplaced. '20 3 The court distinguished Brookfield
on the basis that the use of metatags in Brookfield was not, as in
this case, descriptive. 20 4 The court pointed out that for "a finding
193. Playboy, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.
194. Id.




199. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2000); Playboy, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.
200. Playboy, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1073.
201. Id. (quoting 1 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§11.45, at 82 (1999)).
202. Id. at 1073-74.
203. Id. at 1092.
204. Playboy, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1093.
1370
CONFUSING METATAGS
of likelihood of confusion," "a finding of initial interest confusion"
was not required, but was only optional.20 5 Thus, a finding of initial
interest confusion is not a decisive element in a case if fair use can
be established.2 °6
The court held that the terms used in the defendant's metatags,
although clearly plaintiff's property, were used fairly to describe
the products and services offered on the defendant's website.2 °7
The inclusion of such terms into defendant's metatags was a "logi-
cal way [to allow search engines] to find her site on the web. 20 8
Finally, the court found "no evidence of intent by [the defendant]
to trade upon the goodwill of Plaintiff's marks by falsely implying
sponsorship by or affiliation with" the plaintiff, and granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment.20 9
D. New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants v.
Eric Louis Associates 210
In this case, the plaintiff was a non-for-profit corporation organ-
ized under the laws of New York in 1897. The corporation's total
membership was 30,000 accountants.211 The plaintiff had been us-
ing the common-law "service mark, 21 2 "NYSSCPA," since 1984.213
"Service marks are essentially trademarks used in the sale of ser-
vices, instead of goods[,J" and are thus governed by the same stan-
dards as trademarks.214 The plaintiff fastidiously protected its
mark and permitted its use only through revenue generating agree-
ments.215 In 1994, the plaintiff registered the domain name "nyss-
205. Id. at 1094.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1095.
208. Playboy, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.
209. Id. at 1095-096.
210. N. Y. State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs.,79 F.
Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
211. Id. at 338.
212. Service marks also fall within the protection of the Act and are defined by the
Act as "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof (1) used by a
person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and ap-
plies to register on the principal register established by this chapter, to identify and
distinguish the services of one person, including a unique service, from the services of
others and to indicate the source of the services, even if that source is unknown. Ti-
tles, character names, and other distinctive features of radio or television programs
may be registered as service marks notwithstanding that they, or the programs, may
advertise the goods of the sponsor." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
213. NYSSCPA, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 338.
214. Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 317 n.11.
215. NYSSCPA, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 338.
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cpa.org."21 6 In 1997, the plaintiff began operating a website, which
contained information about the organization.2t 7
The defendant was a small firm, that specialized in accounting
and other financial matters in the tri-state area of New York, New
Jersey and Connecticut.218 In 1998 and 1999, it registered three do-
main names, one of which was "nysscpa.com," and began operating
identical websites at the three Internet addresses.219 The Internet
address "nysscpa.com" contained a disclaimer stating that the de-
fendant was not affiliated with the plaintiff, but, along with the
other two websites, contained the term "NYSSCPA" in its
metatags 2 ° The plaintiff brought a lawsuit in part based on trade-
mark and service mark infringement.221
Because the defendant intentionally copied plaintiff's mark, the
court presumed, as a matter of law, that the likelihood of confusion
requirement was satisfied.22 The court confirmed this presump-
tion when it analyzed the eight Polaroid factors223 to determine
whether a likelihood of confusion exists.224 The court rejected the
defendant's argument that, by including a disclaimer in its website,
it successfully eliminated the likelihood of confusion.225 The court
followed the reasoning in Brookfield226 and held that, even with
the disclaimer, the domain name "nysscpa.com" and the "NYSS-
CPA" metatag "cause[d] a likelihood of confusion because [they]
created initial interest confusion. '227
E. Bihari v. Gross22 8
In this New York Southern District case, the plaintiffs were inte-
rior designers who had been practicing under the name of "Bihari
Interiors" around the country and abroad since 1984.229 Their
name was well known, "particularly in the New York City high-end
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. NYSSCPA, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 339.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 333.
222. Id. at 340.
223. Polaroid v. Polaroid Elecs., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1996); see discussion of the
eight Polaroid factors at supra Part II.C.
224. NYSSCPA, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 341-42.
225. Id. at 342.
226. Brookfield Communications v. W. Coast Entm't, 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
227. NYSSCPA, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 342.
228. Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
229. Id. at 312.
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residential interior design market. ' 230 The plaintiffs did not engage
in paid advertising to promote their business, but relied primarily
on referrals from former clients and other designers.23 a
The defendant was a former client of the plaintiffs who did not
think highly of his former decorators.232 In 1999, the defendant
registered the domain names "bihari.com" and "bihariinteri-
ors.com" and placed disparaging statements about the plaintiffs on
the websites.233 Plaintiffs sought to preliminary enjoin defendant
from using the above-mentioned domain names at which time the
defendant relinquished both of them.234 However, in March 2000,
the defendant registered two more websites, "designscam.com' and
"manhattaninteriordesign.com," both of which contained the same
content as the previous two websites and used the term "Bihari
Interiors" in their metatags.235 The description metatags gave a
brief overview of the site, which also referred to the plaintiffs by
name.
236
The plaintiffs argued that inclusion of the term "Bihari Interiors"
in the metatags of the defendant's websites was likely to cause con-
fusion.237 The court rejected this argument because "no reasonable
viewer would believe that the disparaging comments regarding
Bihari's business ethics ... are endorsed by Bihari. ' 238
The plaintiffs' argument for the likelihood of initial interest con-
fusion was also unsuccessful.239 First, the court was skeptical in ap-
plying the theory to an Internet related case.24° Second, the court
reluctantly and cautiously241 discussed the Brookfield billboard
analogy242 and concluded that this case was missing one vital ele-
ment, "a competing website. '243 The court concluded that any ini-
tial confusion resulting from defendant's websites was not long




233. Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 312.
234. Id. at 313.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 318.
238. Id. at 319.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 319-20 n.15 (stating that the use of the highway
billboard metaphor is not the best analogy to a metatag on the Internet).
242. See supra note 172.
243. Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 320.
244. Id.
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Finally, the court focused on the fair use doctrine.245 The court
held the defendant had not used the term "Bihari Interiors" in its
metatags "as a mark, but rather, [only in a descriptive sense] to
fairly identify the content of his websites." 246 Furthermore, the de-
fendant's inclusion of a disclaimer in his website indicated a good
faith use of the plaintiffs' mark.2 47 The court concluded the defen-
dant acted in good faith because his purpose in using the mark was
not to capitalize on the plaintiffs' reputation or goodwill or any
confusion that may have resulted, but simply to criticize the
plaintiff.248
The court also addressed the public policy aspect of the issue by
declaring that "[a] broad rule prohibiting use of 'Bihari Interiors'
in the metatags of websites not sponsored by Bihari would effec-
tively foreclose all discourse and comment about Bihari Interiors,
including fair comment. '249 The court cautioned against "overex-
tending the reach of the Lanham Act and intruding on First
Amendment values. '250
F. Trans Union v. Credit Research 251
In this Northern District of Illinois case, plaintiffs accused de-
fendants of misusing plaintiffs' trademarks in the metatags of de-
fendants' website.252 The plaintiffs moved to preliminarily enjoin
defendants from the alleged misuse, 53 but the court denied the
motion on the basis that defendants' use of plaintiffs' mark consti-
tuted legitimate and fair descriptive use.254
Plaintiffs were one of the three major credit-reporting agencies
in the country who entered into a service agreement with defend-
ants, a local credit bureau. 5 The service agreement created a con-
tractual relationship between the parties but did not refer to their
intellectual property rights. 6 Plaintiffs owned a federally regis-
tered trade name "Trans Union" and a stylized "TU" logo.257 Be-
245. Id. at 321-22.
246. Id. at 322.
247. Id. at 324.
248. Id. at 323.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Trans Union v. Credit Research, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (N.D. I11. 2001).
252. Id. at 1034.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1040.
255. Id. at 1035.
256. Id. at 1036.
257. Trans Union, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1035.
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cause of their close business association with plaintiffs, defendants
started using plaintiff's trade name and logo.25 8 Plaintiffs did not
authorize such use and found it objectionable. 9 Plaintiffs brought
a lawsuit to enjoin defendants from using the marks on the
metatags of defendants' website.26°
Plaintiffs argued that the defendant's metatags were likely to
create "the false impression that Trans Union endorses or other-
wise is affiliated with defendants' website. '' 261 Defendants re-
sponded that they had a legitimate right to use the plaintiffs' mark
because it was an essential part of their contractual relationship.262
The court followed the fair use defense reasoning in Brookfield,
Bihari and Playboy, and concluded that "there [was] nothing inac-
curate about including Trans Union's trade name in a metatag,
since the metatag simply describe[d] defendants and the content of
their website. '263
IV. DISCUSSION: RECENT LEGAL TRENDS LEAN
AGAINST THE DOCTRINE
A. Recent Legal Trends
Very few cases have considered the improper use of trademarks
in metatags; therefore, it is difficult to guess in what direction this
body of law will develop. Based on the cases discussed in Part III
of this Comment, it appears the courts have begun to increasingly
consider the evidence of a defendant's fair and good faith use of a
plaintiff's marks. The courts also began to focus their attention on
a defendant's intent and most situations have held that where no
culpable intent was present, defendant's use of plaintiff's marks
was not illegal.2"
One well-supported conclusion of the Brookfield court was that
a good faith use of a descriptive term in metatags is allowable.265
Although the Brookfield court was the first court to apply the doc-
258. Id. at 1036.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1037.
261. Trans Union, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1038.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1040.
264. See discussion supra Parts III.C and III.E.
265. See Trans Union v. Credit Research, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1040 (N.D. I11.
2001); see discussion supra Part III.F; see also Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 323-
24; discussion supra Part ILE; see also Brookfield Communications v. W. Coast
Entm't, 174 F.3d at 1065; discussion supra Part III.A.
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trine of initial interest confusion to metatags,266 most of the court's
conclusions, aside from its emphasis on the importance of good
faith use of descriptive terms in metatags, are questionable and
have been extensively debated.267 The court's incomplete under-
standing of the function of search engines resulted in the court
harshly limiting the use of legitimate descriptive terms in
metatags.268 For example, the court found use of the "Moviebuff"'
trademark illegitimate because the term, not being an English
word, was not descriptive.269
Although the court correctly focused on the defendant's intent,
it erroneously concluded that no fair use could exist if the defen-
dant's sole purpose is to attract consumers to his website. 270 This
conclusion begs the query, what other purpose can a business
owner have in setting up a website, if not to attract consumers?
Unfair use does not result from the general business purpose of
attracting consumers, but from the deviant purpose of stealing con-
sumers from the competition by intentionally confusing them.27'
The SNA case, which was decided only a few months after
Brookfield, is a good illustration of such deviant intent.272 The SNA
defendants had intentionally lured Internet users onto their web-
site by repeatedly using the plaintiff's trademark in their
metatags.273 The SNA court was justified in holding that no fair
use could possibly have existed in the case because it found that
defendants had intended to harm the plaintiffs.274
Similarly, the NYSSCPA court further defined limitations on the
fair use defense when it held that defendant's disclaimers of associ-
ation with the plaintiff did not constitute fair use because they were
266. King, supra note 36, at 314; Paylago, supra note 1, at 62.
267. See, e.g., King, supra note 36, at 325-26 (disagreeing with Brookfield's applica-
tion of the doctrine of initial interest confusion to the Internet); McCuiag, supra note
58, at 658-64 (discussing the misconceptions of the Brookfield court's analysis of the
metatag issue); Mills, supra note 20, at *26-29 (discussing the Brookfield analogy and
concluding that the Brookfield court's reasoning that initial interest confusion may be
caused by improper use of metatags is "flawed"). But see Posner, supra note 32, at
445-46 (relying on Brookfield's analysis of the metatag issue).
268. See Mills, supra note 20, at *26-29.
269. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1066; see discussion supra Part III.A.
270. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1066; see discussion supra Part III.A.
271. See, e.g., SNA, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d at 562-63; see discussion supra Part III.B
where the court enjoined defendant's metatagging because defendants had intention-
ally confused internet users.
272. SNA, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d at 562-63; see discussion supra Part III.B.
273. SNA, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d at 562.
274. Id. at 563.
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counteracted by the defendant's bad faith intent to capitalize on
the plaintiff's goodwill.2 75
To the contrary, the Playboy court correctly found the defendant
not to have deviant intent.2 76 The Playboy court was thus justified
in finding fair use.277 There, the defendant did not only legitimately
use the plaintiff's trademark as a descriptive term of herself and
her products, 78 but she also showed good faith when she included
disclaimers to distinguish her website from the plaintiff's and when
she acted with plaintiff's permission to launch her website.279
Similarly, in Bihari, when faced with the issue of the use of
trademarks in metatags, the New York Southern District court fo-
cused on the defendant's intent rather than on the likelihood of
confusion.280 The Bihari court found that the inclusion of a dis-
claimer along with the defendant's legitimate use of the term for
descriptive purposes and lack of desire to capitalize on the plain-
tiff's reputation, constituted legitimate use of the mark.28 '
Lastly, in the most recent case, Trans Union v. Credit Research,
the Northern District of Illinois court also found no evidence of
defendant having used the plaintiff's mark in bad faith. The court
did not even bother to make a determination of whether the defen-
dant's use of the plaintiff's mark in the defendant's metatags could
have caused either actual or initial interest confusion. 82 Instead,
the court concluded that defendant's use of plaintiff's trademark to
describe defendant's business was fair due to defendant's close bus-
iness association with the plaintiff.
283
It appears from the above analysis that courts that have ad-
dressed trademark infringement cases involving metatags have fo-
cused more attention on a defendant's intent than whether the use
in question was likely to cause confusion. The courts also appear
to have thus far had no difficulties in distinguishing good faith from
bad faith in metatag related situations and in drawing the bounda-
ries around the legitimate use of trademarks in metatags. It is
275. N.Y. State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., 79 F.
Supp. 2d at 348; see discussion supra Part III.D.
276. Playboy Enters. v. Terri Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1080. See discussion supra
Part III.C.
277. Playboy, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.
278. Id. at 1078-79.
279. Id. at 1072.
280. Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 322-24; see discussion supra Part III.E.
281. Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 322-24.
282. Trans Union v. Credit Research, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1039-40 (N.D. I11. 2001);
see discussion supra Part III.F.
283. Trans Union, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1039-40 (2001); see discussion supra Part III.F.
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likely, that if courts continue to focus on a defendant's intent, and
to use the fair use defense to decide metatag related trademark
infringement cases, courts may no longer consider the doctrine of
initial interest confusion a useful legal tool in such decision making.
B. The Doctrine of Initial Interest Confusion Should Not Be
Applied to Metatags
The doctrine of initial interest confusion, as it stands presently, is
unnecessary in trademark infringement cases involving metatags
for primarily three reasons. First, the standards for proving likeli-
hood of confusion in trademark infringement cases are already
very relaxed,284 resulting in successful infringement claims even
without a showing of actual confusion.285 Second, a defendant's
inability to succeed with the fair use defense serves as a good safe-
guard against intentional infringers. 286 And third, the common
remedy of trademark infringement, which enjoins a defendant's
use of infringing metatags, may itself intrude upon a defendant's
First Amendment right to freedom of speech. 287
1. Relaxed Standards for Proving Likelihood of Confusion
Already relaxed legal standards for showing the existence of
likelihood of confusion in trademark infringement cases advocate
against the introduction of a new category of confusion. As dis-
cussed in Parts II.B and II.C, to prove trademark infringement, a
plaintiff must show a likelihood of confusion. 288 The best way to
achieve this is to show actual confusion.28 9 Actual confusion, how-
ever, is often very difficult, if not impossible, to prove.29 ° Courts,
realizing the difficulties involved in proving actual confusion, often
allow plaintiffs to forego the showing of actual confusion alto-
gether and instead focus on the other seven Polaroid (or Polaroid-
like) factors of the case to determine whether the likelihood of
confusion exists.29' The standards for proving the likelihood of
284. See discussion supra Parts II.D and IV.B.
285. See discussion supra Introduction and Part I.D.
286. See discussion supra Parts II.E, IV.A and Part IV.B.
287. See discussion supra Part III.E.
288. See discussion supra Parts II.B and II.C.
289. See discussion supra Introduction.
290. See discussion supra Part II.D.




confusion are already very relaxed,292 allowing for a finding of pre-
sale, sale, post-sale and even no-sale confusion based on the cir-
cumstances of each case.293 Etching out a new category of confu-
sion, such as initial interest confusion, serves no purpose when
courts in several districts have already stretched the standards for
satisfying a showing of likelihood of confusion to include any prob-
able type of confusion.294
The opposing argument, in support of courts using initial interest
confusion, rests on the idea that expansion of trademark law into
new fields can be beneficial.295 There is in fact merit to stretching
legal limits to reach equitable results or to comply with public pol-
icy considerations. In this spirit, trademark law was recently ex-
panded to, for example, include such new federally recognized
causes of action as "dilution. ' 296 Under the Federal Trademark Di-
lution Act the owner of a famous mark is entitled to an injunction
if another's commercial use of the mark dilutes the distinctive qual-
ity of the famous mark.297 Dilution theory is based on the concept
that "the more widely a symbol is used, the less effective it will be
for any one user. ' 298 One may argue that because the law has ex-
panded in the direction of dilution, it should also expand to include
initial interest confusion.
Although expansion of law to meet public policy and equity
goals may be beneficial, if such expansion is carried out without
proper evaluation of new technological or societal developments, it
292. Powder River Oil v. Powder River Petroleum, 830 P.2d 403, 416-17 (Wyo.
1992) (holding that a showing of likelihood of confusion is not limited to customers
but can even apply to suppliers).
293. Paylago, supra note 1, at 55-6.
294. See discussion supra Parts II.C and II.D.
295. Mills, supra note 20, at *52 (stating that although courts are sometimes willing
to stretch statutory language to reduce unfairness, this strategy is more likely to be
beneficial in cases of trademark dilution than in cases involving trademark
infringement).
296. See supra note 99 for the definition of dilution. "Bringing a claim on federal
trademark dilution grounds is a relatively new concept. It was not until 1996 in which
it was federally authorized by statute for one to sue on these grounds." Kenneth L.
Port, The Congressional Expansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil Law System
in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 829 (2000) (discussing the social, eco-
nomic and legal foundations of American trademark law and concluding that Ameri-
can trademark law is becoming harmonized with civil law systems); Silberlight, supra
note 32, at 254.
297. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000); see discussion supra Part II.A; see also Silberlight,
supra note 32, at 254.
298. Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of
Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1191 (1948) (raising the question of whether legal
protection of trade symbols furthers private, as well as public, goals).
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can just as easily become a hindrance to the legal process. Courts
must proceed with caution when expanding the application of
traditional legal concepts to such relatively unexplored legal fields
as the Internet. The expansion of the standard for confusion as
used in trademark infringement litigation to metatags may prove
beneficial only if it serves a practical purpose. If such expansion
becomes too convoluted or its purpose too obscure, its application
should be reconsidered.
The Brookfield court began the trend of applying the initial in-
terest confusion doctrine to metatags 99 The court, however, was
not fully informed of the Internet's intricacies.3 " Thus, relying on
the Brookfield decision can lead only to difficulties as more cases
involving metatags reach the courts. Because this Comment fo-
cuses on trademark infringement, rather than dilution, it does not
explore whether the expansion of trademark law to include federal
causes of action for dilution has been beneficial. Thus far, how-
ever, such expansion has been witnessed only in very limited situa-
tions.30 1 The majority of the dilution claims addressed since the
amendment to the Act have involved domain name disputes
only.302 It would be wise to take a similarly cautious approach to
trademark infringement law by not expanding it to the Internet
before acquiring a more solid understanding of how the Internet
functions in our society.
2. Failure of the Fair Use Defense Is a Good Safeguard
The use of the initial interest confusion doctrine in metatag re-
lated cases is unnecessary because the statutory fair use defense
already serves as an effective safeguard against intentional infring-
ers. When courts are faced with the dilemma of metatag related
trademark infringement litigation, they should, as some courts
have already,3 °3 focus not on whether the use of a trademark in
299. Brookfield Communications v. W. Coast Entm't, 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
For a more detailed discussion of the case, see discussion supra Parts III.E and IV.
300. For a more detailed discussion of the case, see discussion supra Parts III.E and
IV.
301. See supra note 99 (discussing the expansion of trademark law by the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act).
302. For a detailed discussion of dilution, see Oscar S. Cisneros, Bally Total Fitness
Holding Corp. v. Faber, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 229, 232-36 (2000) (offering a thor-
ough explanation of trademark dilution and current related law).
303. See Trans Union v. Credit Research, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (N.D. Ill. 2001); see
discussion supra Part III.F; see also Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y.
2000); see also discussion supra Part III.E; see also New York State Soct'y of Certified
Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assoc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see also
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metatags can possibly cause confusion, but rather on whether such
use was perpetrated with a bad faith intent to capitalize on the
plaintiff's goodwill. In situations where bad faith intent is shown,
failure of the fair use defense 30 4 serves as an additional safeguard
even when a court finds the likelihood of confusion improbable.3 °5
In a trademark infringement case, an innocent defendant will likely
not miss the opportunity to establish fair use by showing it lacked
any intent to confuse or to benefit economically from possible con-
fusion. If a plaintiff cannot prove likelihood of confusion, but can
prove the defendant had a bad faith intent to confuse, a court will
likely still enjoin the defendant from further use of the mark.
Therefore, if the purpose of initial interest confusion is to provide
an extra barrier against trademark infringers in cases where confu-
sion is hard to prove, a defendant's failure to meet the require-
ments of the fair use defense will achieve the same result,
rendering the initial interest confusion doctrine superfluous.
3. Enjoining Defendants From Using Other's Marks Stifles Their
Freedom of Speech
If, on the other hand, the purpose of initial interest confusion is
to broaden the already expanded boundaries of the trademark in-
fringement requirements,0 6 then the use of the doctrine may put
the First Amendment right to freedom of speech, the fundamental
purpose of the Internet as a supplier of information, and the princi-
ple of business competition at risk. Courts usually resolve trade-
mark infringement through the use of metatags cases by enjoining
a defendant from using metatags in its website.3°7 This, in a way,
stifles a web designer's freedom of expression. Initial interest con-
fusion may, therefore, result in the infringement of the First
Amendment rights of millions of website owners. At least one
court has already cautioned against such overextension of the
Act,308 and this warning should not be lightly dismissed.
discussion supra Part III.D; see also Playboy Enters. v. Terri Welles, 78 F. Supp.2d
1066 (S.D. Ca. 1999); see also discussion supra Part III.C; see also SNA, Inc. v. Array,
51 F. Supp. 2d 554 (E.D. Pa. 1999); see also discussion supra Part III.B.
304. See discussion supra Part II.E.
305. Id.
306. See discussion supra Part II.C.
307. See discussion supra Part III.
308. Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). For a more detailed
discussion of the case, see discussion supra Parts III.E and IV.
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4. What About Trademark Owners' Rights?
The protection of trademark owners' rights must also be consid-
ered. The purpose of trademark law, after all, is not only to facili-
tate consumers in identifying the sources of the products they buy,
but also to protect the time and expense trademark owners invest
in developing trademarks.3 "9 One argument in support of the pro-
tection of trademark rights relies on the recognition of trademarks
as property, which rests on economic principles.310 The economic
principles are simple: if one is permitted to retain a monopoly in a
term or a concept, he will derive some economic benefit from such
monopoly regardless of how limited that monopoly is. 311 The legal
concept of equivocating trademarks to property, however, is not as
straightforward.312
Trademarks are symbols derived from society and made popular
by being introduced into our culture as communication devices. 313
They not only "identify source or origin for one particular manu-
facturer, they also have iconic value for the society itself. 314 If
trademarks are thus derived from the public and play a vital role in
society, trademark owners should be prohibited from declaring
monopolies on the use of such icons.315
The originator must understand that the mark or symbol or im-
age is no longer entirely its own, and that in some sense it also
belongs to all those other minds who have received and inte-
grated it. This does not imply a total loss of control, however,
only that the public's right to make use of the word or image
must be considered in the balance as we decide what rights the
owner is entitled to assert.316
309. See discussion supra Part II.A.
310. William Romanos, Internet Accuracy Wars: How Trademarks Used in Decep-
tive Metatagging should be Dealt with to Increase Economic Efficiency, 7 U. BALT.
INTELL. PROP. J. 79, 86-91 (1998) (discussing property aspects of the use of trade-
marks in metatags and addressing the question of whether a property right should be
recognized in metatag situations).
311. Id.
312. Look, supra note 1, at 50 (pointing out that there are conflicting opinions on
whether property rights should be protected on the Internet).
313. Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 972-73 (1993)
(arguing that trademarks no longer merely serve to identify sources, but have now
become part of the product itself); Port, supra note 296, at 894.
314. Port, supra note 296, at 894.




Thus, the use of famous marks to describe the contents of a website
may prove irreplaceable.317
Even if trademark owners gain exclusive property rights when
they register and use their marks, it is questionable whether such
economic rights should outweigh the First Amendment rights of
website owners.318 Courts must consider whether an overzealous
protection of trademark owners' rights would in fact be beneficial
to the trademark owners themselves. Trademark owners may ben-
efit from having the freedom to use their competitors' trademarks
in the metatags of their own sites.
It should not be left up to the courts and obscure doctrines, such
as initial interest confusion, to impose strict limitations on the In-
ternet industry. The legislature can devise better-informed, uni-
form, federally imposed rules. These rules will undoubtedly serve
as a better regulator of trademark use on the Internet than inter-
mittent court decisions that typically concentrate only on very nar-
row fact patterns that happen to reach a court's docket. Waiting for
the courts to carve out the appropriate legal boundaries risks fur-
ther confusing the issue.
5. Internet Consumers Are Too Savvy to Be Confused
by Metatags
The insignificant consumer confusion that the doctrine of initial
interest confusion seeks to eradicate may in fact be beneficial for
consumers. When competitors use each others' metatags they not
only supply consumers with a wider array of information on com-
peting or related products, but they also promote competition
among similar businesses. 319 Furthermore, expectations of Internet
consumers differ from expectations of consumers in the physical
world.32 ° Shopping on the Internet involves significantly different
tactics than shopping in the real world.321
Most Internet users are familiar with the intricacies of the In-
ternet shopping process, including the function of search engines.
They know that when they type in their keywords, a number of
317. Id. at 974 (providing examples of how such marks as Xerox, Kleenex, Band-
Aid and Escalator "are particularly apt to fill in gaps in our language").
318. See discussion supra Parts III.E and IV.B.
319. King, supra note 36, at 326.
320. King, supra note 36, at 325 (discussing unique expectations of Internet con-
sumers); Posner, supra note 32, at 493 (noting that Internet users are aware of and
have adapted to manipulative metatagging).
321. King, supra note 36, at 325; Posner, supra 32, at 493.
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possibly unrelated or competing links will be generated.322 In fact,
some consumers, relying on a search engine's ability to provide a
variety of options, depend on the search engine to do their compar-
ison-shopping or to gather information on competing but related
products.323 The courts cannot conclude definitively that the use of
another's trademarks in metatags of a website causes initial interest
confusion without first determining what the consumer's intent was
when entering that particular trademark name into a search en-
gine. For example, a consumer might have been using a famous
mark as a product category identifier 324 to find cheaper substitutes,
with no intention of ever buying the famous name brand product.
It would be quite unfair to both consumers and lesser-known ven-
dors "to limit consumer choice in selecting goods on the Internet to
only well-known products. ' 3 5  Such limitation would preclude
lesser-known vendors from being exposed to potential purchasers
who may actually be seeking the lesser-known vendor's goods. 326
6. Initial Interest Confusion May Not Even Exist in Situations
Where Metatags Are Used Legitimately
Still another query is whether initial interest confusion exists at
all in a legitimately used metatag situation. Consider the following
scenario. A user inputs a keyword into his search engine. The en-
gine comes up with a number of links to different websites and
provides descriptions of the sites underneath each link. Even if the
user does not look at the domain name to determine who owns a
particular website,327 he scans the description of the website before
clicking on the link. If the description contains no reference to the
famous trademark, or if it simply compares the famous trade-
marked product to another product, the user will know the site is
unrelated to the mark, and, therefore, there can be no initial inter-
est confusion. 328
If, however, there is a reference to the mark, but the reference is
designed to confuse, the user may indeed click on the link.32 9 After
322. King, supra note 36, at 325; Posner, supra 32, at 493.
323. King, supra note 36, at 326.
324. Id.
325. McCuaig, supra note 58, at 681.
326. Id.
327. Romanos, supra note 310, 92 (stating that consumers are likely to authenticate
the owner of a website by looking at the domain names before clicking on the link);
Posner, supra note 32, 483 (same).
328. Mills, supra note 20, at *27.
329. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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momentary confusion, however, the user will likely realize his mis-
take and simply click the "back" button of his browser to return to
his original search. 330 Thus, the user's initial confusion can be eas-
ily rectified by just one click of the "back" button.
One counter-argument may be that, when the user clicks on the
"back" button, he is returned to an endless list of websites and, as a
result, remains confused.331 A consumer's confusion may be fur-
ther exacerbated when sly website owners try to outsmart the
search engines by including repetitious or unrelated trademarked
terms in their metatags, thereby increasing the size of the list the
search engine has generated.332 Nevertherless, the modern con-
sumer will likely know to correct this problem by either narrowing
his keywords to generate a smaller list of hits, or by paying more
attention to the domain names.
Moreover, if the user decides to stay on the site of the product
he was not originally searching for, and the trademark owner then
seeks to enjoin the site's use of the owner's mark, lack of good
faith and fair use can likely be easily proven by showing that the
description of the site contained no source identifying distinction,
or that the metatags were intentionally doctored with repetitious
use of the owner's mark.333 The trademark owner can also likely
show that its trademark was used in the metatags of a site com-
pletely unrelated to the owner's site and the sole purpose of its use
was to capitalize on the trademark owner's goodwill. In either
case, courts will most likely find lack of good faith in the use of the
marks and enjoin the defendants from using the marks in their
metatags.
7. Initial Interest Confusion Loses Out in the
Cost-Benefit Analysis
Finally, the last question to ask is whether initial interest confu-
sion makes sense from a cost-benefit standpoint.334 As discussed in
Part III, the most common solution to trademark infringement sit-
uations is for courts to enjoin the infringing website owners from
using another's trademarks in the metatags of their sites.335 An-
other proposed solution is to alter the setup of millions of websites
330. Id.
331. McCuaig, supra note 58, at 662 (discussing Internet search strategies).
332. Posner, supra note 32, at 446 (discussing methods some web designers use to
confuse search engines).
333. See id.
334. Kozinski, supra note 218, at 969.
335. See discussion supra Parts II.B & III.D.
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by dividing metatags into two sections: one that contains all non-
trademark related metatags and another that contains all the trade-
marked terms.336 Theoretically, this alternative will provide courts
with a clear idea of website owner's intent and make it easier to
filter out the infringers.337
Neither of the two solutions is satisfactory. The first solution,
enjoining the infringing website owners from using another's trade-
marks in their metatags, involves considerable court costs for both
sides and, as discussed in Part IV,338 possible First Amendment vio-
lations, reduction of information provided to consumers, and the
stifling of business competition both on and off the Internet. The
second solution, imposing obligatory alterations of metatags on
website owners, will likely result in a loss of millions of dollars,
time and effort necessary to devise new federal regulations and
then alter the code of millions of websites to comply with those
regulations. Is the discomfort of a momentary confusion that is
easily rectified by a couple of clicks of a mouse worth the cost of
altering the codes of millions of websites and reducing the amount
of information the Internet currently provides to consumers?
CONCLUSION
The rapid advent of the Internet has brought countless benefits
for consumers, businesses and the economy. However, to achieve
smooth integration of this new, but enormously popular, technol-
ogy into society, we must be careful not to bootstrap the legal ques-
tions it raises into traditional legal models. The issue of metatag
related trademark violations is one particular area where the tradi-
tional concept of initial interest confusion simply does not produce
a good fit. Some courts have hastily extended this theory onto the
Internet without first fully understanding how metatags function,
or what expectations Internet consumers have. This hastiness not
only risks the creation of confusion and discord in legal circles, but
may potentially cause a massive financial dent in the economy; and
it may also impose unnecessary, if not illegal, limitations on the
way the Internet functions. This Comment strongly encourages
everyone, and especially the courts that are currently, or will be,
faced with this issue in the near future, to, as the old saying goes,
look before they leap.
336. See McCuaig, supra note 58, at 681-88.
337. Id.
338. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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